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Abstract
In 1992 the Japanese government enacted the International Peace Cooperation Law (PKO Law) to dispatch the Self-
Defence Forces (SDF) to the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UN-PKO). Japan’s participation in the peace
operations in Cambodia was the first case to which Japanese peacekeepers were dispatched. This paper contextualises
the history of the Cambodian conflict and Japan’s diplomatic commitment to the Cambodian peace process; moreover
it illustrates how Japan made incremental contributions to the peacekeeping operations in Cambodia. Finally, this
study identifies the development of a shift from negative pacifism based on Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution to
positive pacifism based on the Preamble to the Constitution of Japan which enabled Japan’s participation in the post-
conflict peacekeeping operations in Cambodia.
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Introduction
Historical background of the genocide in Cambodia
In August 1863, Cambodia willingly became a French protectorate to avoid becoming a subject state of Thailand or
Vietnam. During the Second World War, however, the Japanese Imperial Army marched into the Indochina Peninsula
and was stationed in Cambodia by July 1941. Although Prince Norodom Sihanouk declared independence after the
defeat of Japan in 1945, France became a “suzerain” again. In the wake of the Vietnamese movement for
independence, Prince Sihanouk began the campaign to regain independence in 1953. In October of the same year,
France turned over its politico-military control to the Cambodian authority, and Cambodia became independent. As the
Vietnam War intensified, Sihanouk broke off the diplomatic relations with the United States. His economic policies
created domestic unrest and offered pro-American General Lon Nol the opportunity to launch a successful coup d’état
in 1970 (Chandler 1991: 67-72, 197-199). The withdrawal of the US forces after the end of the Vietnam War in 1975,
however, lessened the political power of the Lon Nol government.
The Khmer Rouge, an extreme Maoist-style communist group under the leadership of Pol Pot, took power from
the Lon Nol government in April 1975 and established Democratic Kampuchea. Pol Pot became the first prime
minister and Sihanouk was confined to the Royal Palace in April 1976. On the basis of its extreme communist beliefs,
the Pol Pot government carried out an infamous “genocide” program. Men and women were separated and children
over five or six years old were forced to work. Vietnamese, Chinese, Muslims, and Buddhist monks were deported,
executed or starved to death (Kiernan 1996: 55). The exact number of people who died under the genocide policy of
the Pol Pot is not known, but estimated at about two million or 30% of the entire population at the time (Llewelyn,
Walton and Kikkawa 2009: 174).
The Pol Pot government attempted to create a border conflict with Vietnam to turn attention away from the
domestic issues. In response, the Vietnamese government invaded Cambodia on 25 December 1978 and the Khmer
Rouge fled to Cambodia’s border with Thailand (ibid). In response to the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, China
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attacked Vietnam. The permanent members of the UN Security Council condemned the Vietnam-led invasion, and the
UN General Assembly adopted resolutions, demanding the “withdrawal of Vietnamese forces” (Song 1997: 59-60).
After the invasion, Vietnam supported Heng Samrin in establishing a new government in January 1979. Once in
power, the Heng Samrin government announced that as many as three million people were killed by the Pol Pot
regime. Kimmo Kiljunen (1984: 30) inferred that the purpose of this inflated number was to justify the Vietnamese
invasion. The Heng Samrin government was not widely recognised as the legitimate government of Cambodia,
however. Instead, the Pol Pot faction occupied the seat in the United Nations (Fukuda 1992: 175). In response to the
intervention, Prime Minister Ōhira Masayoshi warned Vietnam that Japan would not make a financial contribution
unless Vietnam took peaceful measures against Cambodia (Hatano 2007: 188-189). The Ōhira government intended to
contribute to conflict resolution through Japan’s economic influence.
In opposition to the Heng Samrin government, the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CDGK)
was established consisting of the Sihanouk faction (under the leadership of Sihanouk), the Son Sann faction (based on
the former Prime Minister Son Sann during the Lon Nol government), and the Pol Pot faction (the most influential
military and economic power among the three parties) (Kōno 1999: 11-17). In order to change Cambodia from the
“killing field” to the “filling field”, the international community began cooperating for post-conflict peace operations
(Uesugi 2004: 222-223). In this context, Japan attempted to make a direct diplomatic effort during the 1989 Paris
Peace Conference.
Methodology
In the post-Cold War period, Japan explored its participation in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UN-PKO).
After the enactment of the International Peace Cooperation Law (PKO Law) on 15 June 1992, the Japanese
government dispatched for the first time three civilian electoral observers to Angola for supervising the national
legislative and presidential elections in September 1992. The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
(UNTAC), however, was the first UN-PKO to which the Japanese government dispatched the Self-Defence Forces
(SDF) (Shinyo 1995: 239). Notably, with regard to its PKO policy, Japan’s attitude towards security policy shifted
from ‘‘negative pacifism’’ based on Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution to ‘‘positive pacifism’’ consistent with the
Preamble of the Constitution (Akimoto 2012); this classification of Japanese pacifism stems from the definition of
negative/positive peace advocated by Johan Galtung (1969).
There are a large number of scholarly works on Japan’s contribution to UN-PKO in Cambodia (e.g. Akashi
2006; Hatano 2007; Llewelyn, Walton and Kikkawa 2009), but the shift to ‘‘positive pacifism’’ tends to be
overlooked. Accordingly, the purpose of the paper is to contextualise and clarify the existence of the shift to positive
pacifism which enabled Japan to join the peace operations in Cambodia. To investigate Japan’s contribution to the
peace process and the peace operations in Cambodia, this paper employs a timeline ‘‘sequence analysis’’ method,
which will assist in examining the historical sequence of case studies in the field of social science (Abbott 1995).
In combination with the historical sequence analysis, this study utilises not only secondary sources published by
leading scholars, but also primary sources, such as statements of parliamentary politicians at the National Diet,
governmental documents by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan (MOFA) and the Japan Defence Agency (JDA). In
the application of the sequence analysis method, this paper reviews the historical background of the Cambodian
conflict and Japan’s diplomatic commitments to the Cambodian peace process. Next, Japan’s preparation for and
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participation in the UNTAC operation will be reviewed. Finally, the paper highlights the shift in Japan’s security
attitude to positive pacifism in the case of Japan’s contribution to the peacekeeping operations in Cambodia.
Findings
Japan’s peace diplomacy and the 1989 Paris Peace Conference
Japan’s diplomatic policies on Cambodia were consistent with the 1977 Fukuda Doctrine, suggested by Prime Minister
Fukuda Takeo who promised Japan would contribute to the “peace and prosperity of the Indochina countries” under
the three principles of international cooperation, announced by Prime Minister Takeshita Noboru in 1988. In July
1989, Japan won the joint chairmanship with Australia for the third committee of the Paris Conference (Kōno 1999:
24-28). However, the first Paris Conference itself was not much satisfactory because of the power-sharing arrangement
among the Cambodian factions.
On 26 September 1989, the Vietnamese government declared the withdrawal of its troops from Cambodia and
the civil war intensified. The US Secretary of State, James Baker, proposed the idea of “neutralisation” of Cambodia
under the transitional authority of the United Nations. The “Baker initiative” triggered the involvement of the P-5 (the
five permanent members of the Security Council) process in the United Nations (ibid: 33-34). On 24 November 1989,
the Australian Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans, in a Parliamentary speech announced a proposal, based on the so called
“Red Book”, which was similar to the Baker initiative. Notably, the Red Book contained a plan for a UN transitional
authority (Department of Foreign and Trade Affairs Australia 1990; Evans 1993: 107-108).
Japan’s involvement in the Cambodian peace process was not smooth. This was because the Heng Samrin
government had the support of Vietnam which had been in a state of war with the United States. Moreover, the United
States supported the Non-Communist Resistance (NCR), composed of the Sihanouk faction, or United National Front
for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC) and the Son Sann faction, or Khmer
People’s National Liberation Front (KPNLF). As a US ally, the Japanese government needed to be careful in making a
diplomatic commitment to Cambodia because of the deteriorated relations between the United States and Vietnam
(Kōno 1999: 52-54). Kōno Masaharu, a senior MOFA official, visited Washington to persuade the US government to
support Japan’s diplomatic involvement in the Cambodian peace process. Kōno emphasised that Japan had the right to
play a political role instead of only making a financial contribution. Finally, Washington agreed to Japan’s diplomatic
contact with the Heng Samrin Cambodia and MOFA decided to contact the Phnom Penh government by dispatching
Kōno in February 1990. Kōno met the government officials and succeeded in revitalising the diplomatic relationship
with the Heng Samrin regime (ibid: 52-56). This diplomatic effort led to the Tokyo Conference in 1990.
The 1990 Tokyo Conference: a step for the Cambodian peace process
The Tokyo Conference on 4~5 June 1990, allowed Prince Sihanouk, Hun Sen, and Son Sann to discuss the Cambodian
peace process, and broke the military deadlock after the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces and political impasse
following the failure of the third Jakarta Informal Meeting held in February 1990. The Tokyo Conference had
significance since it was one of the rare cases of Japan’s direct involvement in the international peace process in the
post-war diplomatic history.
Still, there were some criticisms. Song Jin (1997: 72) described the conference as a failure because the “Khmer
Rouge refused to abide by any agreement it had not signed”. Nonetheless, the conference was an unprecedented
diplomatic contribution and created opportunities for the Cambodian peace process. Successful aspects of the Tokyo
Conference included the fact that Prince Sihanouk and Prime Minister Hun Sen signed a joint communiqué which
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included a number of agreements such as the establishment of the Cambodian Supreme National Council (SNC) to
balance the representatives from the two governments. After the conference, the Japanese government used shuttle
diplomacy to foster higher levels of trust. Ambassador Imagawa Yukio was dispatched to Phnom Penh in February
1991, and Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki and Foreign Minister Nakayama Tarō met Prime Minister Son Sann in March
1991 in Tokyo. Foreign Minister Nakayama met Prince Sihanouk in April in Beijing and Ōwada Hisashi, Vice
Minister of MOFA, spoke to Hun Sen (Llyewelyn, Walton and Kikkawa 2009: 182-184).
The Tokyo Conference and the following diplomatic talks garnered trust from Cambodian leaders. One of the
reasons for the success of the SNC in the Tokyo Conference could be the absence of the Khmer Rouge; according to
Imagawa (2000: 98-99), if the Khmer Rouge participated in the process of setting up the SNC, the Conference would
have failed. Although Khieu Samphan did not participate in the Conference, the Khmer Rouge accepted the power
sharing of the SNC three months after the Conference (Ikeda 1996: 78-85). The relative share in the SNC decisions in
the Tokyo Conference (Hun Sen faction 6, Sihanouk faction 2, Son Sann faction 2, and the Khmer Rouge faction 2)
was approved by the four Cambodian factions including the Khmer Rouge as well as the P5 and Indonesia (ibid: 102).
The establishment of an appropriate power sharing deal among the four factions was one of the most important aspects
in the resolution of the Cambodian conflict. Thus the Tokyo Conference demonstrated Japan’s capacity to be effective
in diplomacy and was a significant step forward in the Cambodian peace process.
The 1991 Paris Agreements: a blueprint for UNTAC
On 23 October 1991 agreements on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict (Paris Peace
Agreement) were signed which prescribed a ceasefire and a move towards a peaceful liberal democracy in Cambodia.
The agreement was signed by the SNC, as the representative and legitimate authority in Cambodia, and 18 other
countries in the presence of UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar. The significance of the Paris Peace
Agreement lies in the fact that it put an official end to the 20 year long war in Cambodia (Suntharalingam 1997: 82).
The agreement concluded that the factional armies had to be disarmed and demobilised. In short, democratisation and
demilitarisation were used to help establish a peaceful democratic government. Until the general election was held in
May 1993, the SNC was to take charge of the sovereign authority. In November 1991, Sihanouk returned to Phnom
Penh as President of the SNC, and the United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) was organised
(Llyewelyn, Walton and Kikkawa 2009: 186). UNAMIC was set up with the purpose of monitoring the ceasefire and
mine-clearance program based on UN Security Council Resolution 717, 16 October 1991. UNAMIC functioned more
like a “proxy”; its role was not as comprehensive as that of UNTAC with 379 peacekeepers composed of civilian and
military staff, logistics and support personnel as well as a military mine awareness unit (Lee Kim and Metrikas 1997:
109-110). During the UNAMIC operation, the Japanese government was still in the middle of a deliberation whether
the SDF could participate in the post-conflict peace operations. Even after the establishment of UNTAC, Japan could
not deploy the SDF without the enactment of PKO legislation.
The Paris Peace Agreement authorised the political legitimacy of the SNC and stipulated the establishment of
UNTAC (Embassy of Japan in Cambodia). According to Michael Doyle (1995: 27-28), the roles of UNTAC
prescribed in the Paris Agreement were mainly traditional UN peacekeeping operations, emphasis on a “neutral
political environment” and “free and fair elections”. More importantly, the Paris Agreements contributed to
establishing a “liberal democracy” by setting up the Cambodian Constitution (ibid: 28-29). Despite these positive
efforts, the Khmer Rouge did not accept the UNTAC operations and repeatedly violated the ceasefire disturbing and
attacking peacekeepers, and arguing that UNTAC operations increased the influence of Vietnam (Imagawa 2000).
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Nonetheless, in the context of its diplomatic commitments through the 1989 Paris Conference, the 1990 Tokyo
Conference, and the authorisation of the 1991 Paris Agreements, the Japanese government explored ways to dispatch
SDF to UNTAC.
Establishment of UNTAC and appointment of SRSG Akashi Yasushi
UNTAC, the largest PKO in the UN history at that time, was organised to ensure the implementation of the Paris
Agreement based on the UN Security Council Resolution 745. UN Under-Secretary-General Akashi Yasushi was
designated as the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) and Chief of Mission for Cambodia and
Lieutenant-General John Sanderson was nominated as the Force Commander. As many as 15,991 troops were
deployed and approximately $1.6 billion was spent on UNTAC (United Nations 2012). The fact that Akashi was
appointed to the SRSG was fortunate for Japan because of a desire in Tokyo to change from passive diplomacy to a
more active and creative approach.
In additional, Ogata Sadako, UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), was responsible for the
repatriation of about 370,000 Cambodian refugees. The role played by these two Japanese officials working for the
United Nations assisted Japan’s efforts at proactive diplomacy in Asia and at the United Nations. Meanwhile,
Cambodia requested that Japan make a contribution to the UNTAC operation. On 22 March 1992, Cambodian Prime
Minister Hun Sen visited Tokyo and asked Foreign Minister Watanabe Michio to dispatch SDF to Cambodia
(Imagawa 2000: 154-155, 162-163). Prince Sihanouk told Ambassador Imagawa that “Japan Self-Defence Forces are
the most ideal for the UNTAC operation because the Japanese Constitution completely renounces acts of aggression”
(ibid: 164). One of the reasons why the Socialist Party and other opposition parties were against the dispatch of the
SDF was opposition from the Asian countries (Miyoshi 1994: 57-58). Therefore, the requests from Prime Minister Hun
Sen and Prince Sihanouk were significant factors in the enactment of the PKO Bill.
UNTAC operations were divided into several divisions and multifunctional in comparison with conventional
UN-PKO (MOFA 2012a). The SDF participated in the civilian policy component, electoral component, military
observers (ceasefire units) and engineering units (ibid). Not only the personnel of the SDF, but also 75 civilian police
officers were dispatched for the UNTAC operation and were assigned to provincial and local police stations to deal
with the investigations and actual criminal cases as well as to control the rush-hour traffic in Phnom Penh and other
cities (MOFA 2012b). To assist these components of the UNTAC, the “Ministerial Conference on Rehabilitation and
Reconstruction of Cambodia” was held in Tokyo (Doyle 1995: 30). The characteristics of UNTAC operations were
unique and unprecedented in that its peacekeeping operations were comprehensive and “multidimensional peace
operations” (Doyle 1997: 1). In particular, the United Nations played a significant role as a temporary transitional
authority. These multidimensional operations in UNTAC required special training of SDF contingents for
peacekeeping operations.
SDF preparation for UNTAC: training as a UN peacekeeper
The Japanese government dispatched “international peace cooperation inspectors” to investigate actual conditions in
the UN-PKO on 1 July 1992. On 27 July, representatives from the JDA staff participated in the UN training centre in
Sweden to acquire general know-how. After an official request from the United Nations on 3 September, the Japanese
government decided on the “programme on UNTAC operation” in the Cabinet Council on 8 September (JDA 1993:
179). Before participating in UNTAC, the Ground Self-Defence Forces (GSDF) personnel were retrained as
international peacekeepers at the Sweden UN Centre. This included information on UN-PKO, conditions of the field,
English language course, and health and hygiene matters (ibid: 181-183). The Maritime Self-Defence Force (MSDF)
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and the Air Self-Defence Force (ASDF) conducted an in-depth investigation as international peace cooperation
inspectors (ibid: 183-185). Because of the training programs, unlike other countries the government could not dispatch
SDF to UN-PKO straight away. This process can be considered the first step for Japan’s military normalisation as it
enabled the SDF to contribute to international peacekeeping operations. Meanwhile, the training of the SDF at the UN
Centre in Sweden enabled the SDF to carry out the tasks of an international peacekeeper.
SDF participation in UNTAC: activities as a UN peacekeeper
The first battalion of the GSDF departed the Komaki base by C-130 aircrafts on 23 and 24 September 1992, and
arrived in Cambodia on 25 and 26 September, and all of 600 members of the first battalion reached Cambodia by 14
October. The first battalion carried out peacekeeping operations for six months and returned to Japan on 10 April 1993.
The second battalion arrived on 8 April 1993. After moving to Takeo (stronghold of the SDF), GSDF performed a
search and clearing of the bomb disposals (ibid: 185-187). The primary mission of the first 600-member engineering
contingents was to reconstruct the roads and bridges destroyed by the civil war. At the request from UNTAC, the
peacekeeping role of the SDF was expanded to include water and food, medical services, fuel and transportation,
lodging facilities, and the protection of material related to the election (MOFA 2012b). The second battalion was
organised on 8 March 1993 to succeed the first one and undertake the same operations. They departed from Japan on
29 March and all 600 members completely arrived by 11 April. Following the death of some Japanese UNTAC staff,
the second battalion took precautionary measures with necessary weapons, bullet-proof vests, and iron helmets. The
second battalion also provided support for parliamentary elections, such as transportation of election-related
equipment, construction of large awnings for ballot-counting stations, and safekeeping of the emergency food under
the instruction of prime minister and UNTAC (JDA 1993: 189-190).
However, the Khmer Rouge did not stop attacking UNTAC peacekeepers. As a result, in a meeting of the
expanded P5, the United States and Australia suggested the implementation of military sanctions against the Khmer
Rouge on the basis of Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter. France and Japan contended that the United Nations
should take non-military but effective measures so as not to violate the Paris Peace Agreements and the Five Principles
of the PKO Law. The UN Security Council as well as Japan cooperated to write a compromise plan as UNSC
Resolution 792, which stipulated “measures” (not sanctions) against the Khmer Rouge including a ban on the supply of
petroleum products, timber, ore and jewels. It was a rare case for Japanese diplomacy that Japan was actively involved
in writing the UN Security Council Resolution (Ikeda 1996: 194-196). The Japanese government’s involvement in
writing UN Resolution 792 symbolises the dilemma between the normative constraint of the Five Principals and the
reality in Cambodia.
Impact of the death of Japanese citizens in Cambodia
As a professional military organisation, SDF contingents were able to protect themselves but UN volunteers and police
officers were defenceless against the Khmer Rouge attacks. On 8 April 1993, a United Nations Volunteer Nakata
Atsuhito was shot dead. In response, Akashi stated “if one more electoral worker is killed, the UN Volunteers (the
principal electoral organisers) would be withdrawn” (Doyle 1995: 58). On 3 May, a civilian police Takada Haruyuki
was murdered by the Khmer Rouge forces while moving with Dutch troops (Imagawa 2000: 196-203). These incidents
happened because unlike the SDF, UN Volunteers and civilian police did not choose safe places. In fact before Nakata
and Takada were murdered, Ambassador Imagawa expressed concern about the security situation of civilian police on
January 6th (Kondō 1994: 27, 37). Akashi stated that “this sacrifice rather strengthened our determination to carry out
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our purpose” and that “Prince Sihanouk promised the Secretary-General (Boutros Ghali) and me to wholly support the
UNTAC operation” (Miyoshi 1994: 176).
John Sanderson recognised the importance of this arrangement because it explicitly indicated that UNTAC
would not allow the Khmer Rouge to disrupt the National Assembly Election. Akashi also supported military
assistance from the Phnom Penh government as long as it did not exceed the exercise of the self-defence right or
violate the ceasefire stipulated in the Paris Agreement (ibid: 183-184). The decision of the Defence Arrangement
without the agreement of the Khmer Rouge as a key conflict party could have invalidated the “neutrality” of the United
Nations. Yet, this decision was based on a realistic evaluation of the situation that the Khmer Rouge did not possess
sufficient military power to disrupt the entire election (ibid). After the death of Nakata and Takada, a debate surged in
Japan about the SDF and possible withdrawal from Cambodia. A particular issue was concern over the fact that the
Khmer Rouge did not accept disarmament and had become more rebellious. Terrorism, violence, and military raids
occurred as the day of the National Assembly Election approached. In the wake of the death of two Japanese citizens,
the opposition parties in Japan began arguing that the Japanese government should pull out the SDF on the basis of the
Five Principles (Ikeda 1996: 181-182).
Furthermore, the plan to withdraw the SDF was discussed within the LDP government, and according to Akashi,
even Chief Cabinet Secretary Kōno Yōhei was supportive of the pull-out plan. However, Prime Minister Miyazawa
Kiichi made a final decision not to withdraw the SDF and the government explained to the public that peacekeeping
operations might entail danger but that the “noble mission” has to be completed (Miyoshi 1994: 198-206). Thus, the
Miyazawa government expressed its support for UNTAC to carry out the National Assembly Election. Even if the
security situation worsened in a certain area, it was not considered as a violation of ceasefire because the ceasefire was
a must for peacekeeping operations and the SDF had to be pulled out otherwise. The Five Principles on UN-PKO were
interpreted as not being violated (Ikeda 1996: 188, 193) and in spite of the deaths of Japanese citizens, Prime Minister
Miyazawa made a pragmatic decision not to withdraw the Japanese peacekeepers.
The General Assembly elections in Cambodia
To support the National Assembly elections which enacted the Cambodian Constitution, five national government
officers, 13 local government officers, and 23 individuals from the private sectors were dispatched from Japan. They
stayed at schools and temples in Takeo and Phnom Penh to monitor the process of the election. As a result of the
support from UNTAC, the National Assembly election was held from 23 to 28 March 1993 (MOFA 2012b). The SDF
patrolled the election areas to support the Japanese electoral monitors, though it was a dangerous operation. The
“patrol” of the SDF turned out to be effective and prevented from possible armed attacks by the Pol Pot (Yanagihara
1994: 54-55).
In spite of violent disturbance by the Khmer Rouge, the National Assembly election was carried out and the
Phnom Penh government, which had been in power for 13 years, was defeated by FUNCINPEC. More than 89.5% of
eligible voters (4.26 million people) voted in the election. The participation of an overwhelming number of voters
indicated the success of the election which owed it partly to “Radio UNTAC” notifying the details of the elections
around the entire country. From 7 April to 19 May, the radio broadcasted information about the election, political
opinions presented by each political party, and opportunities for objection if a political party was unreasonably
slandered (Yamauchi 1992: 21-24; Yamauchi 2002). FUNCINPEC established the coalition government with the
former Phnom Penh government. The United States and the UN headquarters as well as UNTAC were concerned that
it could harm the principle of democracy. However, both Akashi and Sanderson came to the conclusion that radio
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broadcasts were the best option. In September 1993, the new Constitution was promulgated and the Constitutional
Monarchy reinstated with the inauguration of Sihanouk (Akashi 2006: 62). The General Assembly election turned out
to be successful due to the decisions made by Akashi.
Post-election peace-building operations in Cambodia
The second battalion was ordered by UNTAC to construct a container storage space at Sihanoukville port. The
activities were supported by the headquarter control troops made up of about 220 members in charge of meal and water
supply, bathing, maintenance of vehicles, fuel, and medical and sanitary affairs, especially preventing Malaria. The
two MSDF transport ships Miura and Ojika and the MSDF replenishment ship Towada were dispatched from Kure
port to Cambodia on 17 September and arrived in Sihanoukville on 2 October 1992. These MSDF ships supported the
accommodation of about 5,000 people, produced about 14,000 meals, and offered medical support for about 200
people. The ASDF troops had been dispatched to Thailand, the Philippines and Cambodia since 21 September 1992 to
support air-transport for the first battalion. Six C-130H crafts departed from the Komaki base on 23 and 24 September
and six others were dispatched on 1 and 2 October. The purpose of these ASDF airplanes was to support activities on
the spot with replenishment tools (JDA 1993: 190-195). Eight GSDF personnel participated in the ceasefire monitoring
in cooperation with troops from other countries. The first eight ceasefire observers were dispatched from September
1992 to March 1993. The second eight personnel were dispatched from March to September 1993. Their peacekeeping
mission was rather hazardous as the operation required not only monitoring the ceasefire but also supervising
encampments, controlling disarmed weapons, and monitoring the border to prevent infiltration by other forces and the
smuggling of weapons and ammunitions. According to SDF personnel who participated in UNTAC, they felt proud of
new roles of SDF as international peacekeepers (ibid: 196-199).
Discussion
An assessment of SDF participation in UNTAC
Although it is difficult to assess the successfulness of SDF’s participation in UNTAC, measurable achievements in the
operation can be raised. As described above, the SDF participated in peacekeeping and peace-building in Cambodia
and did not play a particularly military role. Yet, the presence of the SDF functioned as a “deterrent” against the
Khmer Rouge. In fact, one of the leaders of Khmer Rouge told Ambassador Imagawa after the UNTAC operation was
over that the Khmer Rouge did not attack the base of the SDF because they assumed that the SDF brought brand-new
and expensive equipment and weapons including at least 200 machine guns (Imagawa 2000: 184). Furthermore, former
US Ambassador to the United Nations, Madeleine Albright was impressed by observing the peacekeeping operations
of the SDF and repeatedly (three times) told Ambassador Imagawa that “Japan is entitled to be a permanent member of
the UN Security Council” (ibid: 186-187). Therefore, sending SDF to UNTAC represents Japan’s motivation to
enhance its international profile and political influence. The above two examples do not necessarily mean that Japan
increased its military power and international prestige through peacekeeping activities, but signify the success of SDF
participation in UNTAC. Simultaneously, Japan succeeded in transforming its self-defence force into international
peacekeepers. Moreover, the SDF dispatch contributed to the success of the UNTAC operation itself.
As Michael Doyle pointed out, UNTAC contributed to the independence of Cambodia which was once colonised
by France, invaded by Japan and Vietnam, and influenced by the power politics of China, Russia, and the United States
in the Cold War. Secondly, the presence of UNTAC troops had an impact on the ceasefire to the Cambodian Civil
War. As described above, even the presence of the Japanese Self Defence Forces acted as a deterrent. Thirdly,
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repatriation of 370,000 refugees from Thailand by the Repatriation Component of UNTAC (staffed by UNHCR) was
also successful. UNHCR under the leadership of Ogata Sadako took a bigger responsibility in the repatriation process
of Cambodian refugees. Fourthly, implementation of democratic elections became characteristic of peacekeeping
operations of UNTAC (Doyle 1995: 32-34, 57-58). In addition, given the ongoing threat of violence by the Khmer
Rouge, the “most momentous action Special Representative Akashi took was to recommend moving ahead toward the
election” (ibid). Although a Japanese UN volunteer and a civilian police were victimised, SDF participation in
UNTAC can be regarded as a success.
Negative pacifism: Article 9 as a normative constraint on SDF dispatch
Negative pacifism has been a restrictive factor to the overseas dispatch of the SDF. The most effective example of the
influence of negative pacifism was the rejection of the 1990 UN Peace Cooperation Bill. The Five Principles and the
“freeze” of PKF participation, moreover, were by-products of negative pacifism. In fact, according to the opinion poll
of the Yomiuri Shimbun, 53.6% favoured the “freeze” of PKF participation whereas 22.7% opposed it. Moreover, 56%
of the same group still considered the SDF’s overseas deployment “problematic” in terms of Article 9 of the
Constitution (Shinn 1992: 3, 5).
Not surprisingly, the overseas dispatch of the SDF was opposed by Japanese leftist politicians. On 11 November
1991, during the deliberation of the PKO Bill at the Diet, Tanabe Makoto from the JSP denied the necessity of the SDF
dispatch to Cambodia (NDL, Proceedings of the 122nd Diet Session, Lower House Plenary Session, 11 November
1991). Tanabe also argued that the PKO Bill presented by the government, which mainly aimed at the overseas
dispatch of the SDF, was inappropriate to the needs of the Cambodian people (NDL, Proceedings of the 123rd Diet
Session, Lower House Plenary Session, 28 January 1992). In short, the Socialist Party insisted on the withdrawal of the
PKO Bill to observe the “non-military” role of a pacifist Japan, based on Article 9. Likewise, Ueda Kōichirō from the
Japanese Communist Party (JCP) expressed his opposition to the bill, paying attention to Article 9 and the “ban on the
overseas deployment of the SDF” adopted by the House of Councilors in 1954 (NDL, Proceedings of the 123rd Diet
Session, Upper House Plenary Session, 6 June 1992).
Based on negative pacifism, a group of Japanese citizens filed a lawsuit against the Japanese government
(Kenmochi et al. 1998: 10-15). The group, who opposed the overseas dispatch of SDF, sued the government arguing
that the PKO Law interfered with Article 9 and was unconstitutional (ibid). According to the plaintiffs, the SDF set up
a base at a former Japanese Imperial Army establishment so the SDF was called the “Japanese Army” by Cambodian
people. As an alternative, they suggested that the Japanese government could have contributed to UNTAC by non-
military means such as medical service and human rights activities as carried out by the Sweden government (ibid).
Although the plaintiffs lost the case, Article 9 was still a source of argumentation.
In the wake of the deaths of UN Volunteer Nakata and the Civilian Police Takada, even LDP members began
considering the withdrawal of the SDF from Cambodia. Junichirō Koizumi, then Minister of Posts and
Telecommunications, argued in the Diet that the deaths of Nakata and Takada were not something the Japanese
government assumed at the outset in the Cambodian peacekeeping operations. Koizumi pointed out the limitations of
the PKO Law as well as the necessity of the withdrawal of the SDF out of Cambodia (NDL, Proceedings of the 126th
Diet Session, Upper House Communication Committee, 13 May 1993; NDL, Proceedings of the 126th Diet Session,
Lower House, Communication Committee, 19 May 1993).
Koizumi’s opposition indicates how influential negative pacifism was as Japan dealt with its first experience in a
UN-PKO. At the stage of UNTAC participation, Japan had not reached a consensus regarding practicability of the SDF
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dispatch to UN-PKO. This uncertainty led to opposition to SDF participation in UNTAC. As explained in the next
section, the Japanese government shifted focus from negative pacifism to positive pacifism based on the Preamble of
the Constitution to overcome these obstacles.
Positive pacifism: the preamble and the SDF for international cooperation
Japanese Diet members began quoting the Preamble of the Japanese Constitution (positive pacifism) to legalise SDF
dispatch for post-war peace operations. The Special Study Group on Japan’s Role in the International Community, the
so-called “Ozawa Committee” played a central role as a domestic pressure group on this shift in security policy which
eventually enabled the SDF to participate in UNTAC. The content of the Ozawa Committee was made up of
“reinterpretation of the Japanese Constitution” and “suggestions for Japan’s security policy”. The reinterpretation of
the Constitution by the Ozawa Committee referred to the concept of “positive pacifism” which facilitates Japan’s
international contributions. The report of the Ozawa Committee emphasised on the positive spirit of the Japanese
Constitution as “active pacifism and completely different from negative pacifism” (Okumiya 1992: 161).
Thus, the Ozawa report explicitly distinguished “negative pacifism” from “positive pacifism” to justify Japan’s
contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security. Notably, not only the LDP government but also
Kōmeitō supported the shift from negative pacifism to positive pacifism. On 24 September 1991, Watanabe Ichirō
from Kōmeitō quoted the Preamble of the Constitution (NDL, Proceedings of the 121st Diet Session, Lower House
Plenary Session, 24 September 1991). Furthermore, Watanabe pointed out that participation in UN-PKO is congruous
with “UN centrism” as Japan’s diplomatic policy (ibid). Although Kōmeitō was an opposition party at that time, the
party shared the view of the government that the Preamble can be a constitutional base to justify Japan’s participation
in UN-PKO. In response to the statement of Watanabe, Prime Minister Kaifu responded that “I completely agree with
the idea that participation in UN-PKO is consistent with the Preamble of the Constitution as well as UN centrism as a
diplomatic stance of our country” (ibid). As shown in these statements, the Preamble as “positive pacifism” was a
keyword to legitimatise the SDF dispatch for post-war peacekeeping operations.
Likewise, Prime Minister Miyazawa quoted the Preamble to justify the legitimacy of the PKO Bill, stating that
“the contents of the PKO Bill are obviously what the Constitution of our country and its Preamble expects, and there is
no doubt that it is peaceful international contributions” (NDL, Proceedings of the 123rd Diet Session, Upper House
Plenary Session, 30 January 1992). Immediately after the enactment of the PKO Law on 15 June 1992, Prime Minister
Miyazawa furthermore reconfirmed the legitimacy of SDF participation in UN-PKO referring to pacifism and
international cooperation in the Constitution (Maeda 1993: 118). These statements show that the Japanese government
decided to justify the SDF dispatch for UN-PKO based on the Preamble of the Japanese Constitution (positive
pacifism).
Conclusion
As examined through the historical sequence analysis, a shift happened from “negative pacifism” to “positive
pacifism” through the SDF dispatch to UNTAC. Japanese diplomatic commitment to the Cambodian peace process
became gradually active in the 1989 Paris Conference. By the 1990 Tokyo Conference, which led to the signing of the
1991 Paris Agreements and participation in UNTAC, Japanese diplomats demonstrated a commitment to resolving the
Cambodian imbroglio. Although the SDF dispatch to the Gulf War was prohibited by opposition based on Article 9 of
the Japanese Constitution (negative pacifism), the SDF dispatch to UNTAC was approved in the Diet on the basis of
the Preamble of the Constitution (positive pacifism).
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Before participating in UNTAC, the Japanese government sent the international peace cooperation observers to
Cambodia. The GSDF personnel were trained as international peacekeepers in the Sweden UN Centre and the Japanese
peacekeepers were dispatched to UNTAC on the basis of the PKO Law. This process shows that the nature of Japan’s
military was transformed into an international peacekeeper. Even after the deaths of Japanese citizens, Prime Minister
Miyazawa decided to continue Japan’s contribution to UNTAC. Hence, Japanese peacekeepers were able to contribute
to the General Assembly election and post-election peacebuilding in Cambodia.
The SDF’s as well as Japan’s participation in UNTAC can be considered successful for a number of reasons,
including the end of civil war, independence, return of 370,000 refugees, and a 90% voting rate in the democratic
National Assembly Elections. This became a turning-point in Japan’s security policy which is recognized by the shift
from negative pacifism to positive pacifism. In sum, Japan’s participation in UNTAC was the very first case that
Japanese peacekeepers made international contribution on the basis of positive pacifism.
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